As of August 2026, who's winning the Russia-Ukraine War? Elena Gold

 

Profile photo for Elena Gold Elena Gold · Follow Wrote a book about Russia-Ukraine war1h As of August 2026, who's winning the Russia-Ukraine War? The definition of “winning the war” requires clarification, to answer this question. The Russia-Ukraine war is ongoing for 12.5 years—since Putin’s invasion of Crimea and Donbas in 2014—in February 2022, Putin gathered forces and planned a 3-day military operation to “end the war”: Putin’s plan was to capture Kyiv and install a puppet government in Ukraine. Putin’s plan failed. The full-scale war is now in its 5th year. Ukraine just celebrated her 5th wartime Independence Day. On August 24, 2026, Zelenskyy held a military parade in Kyiv—and he didn’t need a permission from Putin to do it (Putin begged Trump to convince Zelenskyy not to target his military parade in Moscow on May 9, 2026). Putin says “Russia is winning,” because, according to him, the Russian troops are capturing more territory. However: Territorial gains by Russia are minuscule: in July 2026, Russian troops captured 830 square km, but they lost 780 square km of the territory that Ukraine managed to de-occupy in other areas. On the balance, Russia gained only 50 square km. The speed of Russian advances is 3.5 times slower than in 2025—while personnel losses are higher. Russia is now losing over 400 soldiers to capture 1 square km of the Ukrainian territory. The grey zone (aka “kill zone”) keeps expanding. That’s the zone where no human can get outside without the fear of being immediately hit by a drone or artillery. At some areas, the grey zone extends up to 20–30 km deep. Based on that, any claims of territorial control (presence of troops by either side) become meaningless: the troops have no real control. Now, let’s look at what is happening in the war on the macro level: Russia lost its strategic rear. Swarms of Ukrainian drones are successfully targeting valuable Russian assets deep in the rear up to 3,000 km: oil refineries, logistics warehouses, military bases, industrial plants. Ukraine has developed its own missile program. Ukrainian Flamingo cruise missiles are already destroying Russian military assets; Ukrainian ballistic missiles are now being tested—these missiles will be able to reach Moscow. Putin says that “Russian strikes hurt Ukraine more.” But this equilibrium can change—Ukraine keeps gaining more military strength and keeps improving her ability to inflict more devastating damage on Russia. From the point of view of strategic aims, Putin failed to achieve any of the goals he proclaimed at the start of the invasion in February 2022: Putin demanded “demilitarization” of Ukraine—instead, Ukraine now has the strongest and most capable army in Europe, heavily armed; Ukraine is becoming one of the global leaders in military tech. Putin demanded “denazification”—meaning “regime change” and installing a puppet government—he failed to achieve it; Ukraine as a nation is now united in their resolve to not become a Russian colony again. Putin claimed he wanted to “liberate the people of Donbas”—instead, the Russian army “liberated” a large area of Donbas from people, razed numerous cities and towns into ruins, tens of thousands of civilians who lived in these cities were killed in Russian strikes. The unannounced Putin’s goal was to steal assets—instead, his army turned the previously prosperous territory into scorched earth: destroying cities is the only way the Russian army manages to capture territory. And Russia already has 17 million square kilometers of territory—most of it uninhabited and undeveloped. Does gaining 800 square km of ruins—and losing 40 thousand men doing that—qualify as a “win”? That’s the arithmetics of Putin’s monthly “territorial gains.” As to Donbas, Putin failed to capture the whole of Donbas in 4.5 years. Putin now demands that Ukraine cede the land to Russia without fighting—because he knows that taking over the fortified areas of Western Donbas (which are still under the Ukrainian control) would require sacrificing 500,000 more Russian soldiers (whom Putin still needs to recruit or mobilize first). Of course, Putin is prepared to sacrifice as many Russians as necessary. But even if Putin captures the remaining 20% of the Donetsk region, the macro situation for Russia won’t change: Russia lost the European markets, lost nearly 1.5 million soldiers, emptied its coffers, fell behind in the technological race, Russia’s infrastructure hasn’t been maintained for 4 years and is getting to the “beyond repair” state; fuel, logistics, and banking crises are running economy to the ground; over a million of educated young Russians left the country; border regions of Russia are getting devastated by Ukrainian counter strikes and start looking like Donbas ruins. Putin is like a gambler who sold everything of value from his home and drove his kids to escape—but he keeps gambling, confident he’s going to score a “big win,” which would make up for all the losses. It won’t happen. Because it can’t happen. Russia will never be as influential and wealthy as before Putin invaded Ukraine—not in the next few decades. The war is not a “win” for Russia. It’s not a “win” for Putin. It’s not a “win” for the gang of his buddies—their lives aren’t any better: they lost the ability to travel the world on their yachts and entertain like the rich capitalists they like to be; they and their families are now targets; they have to work harder, fulfilling Putin’s demands to deliver for the army; they have to stay in Russia, while they prefer to relax in the most luxurious destinations of the world—but they can’t. The war is definitely not a “win” for the ordinary Russians: their money is worth less, their sons, fathers, and husbands are being sent to die, their cities are being attacked, their businesses might end abruptly any day; no confidence in the future, everyone expects things to get worse. Someone might say: “but in Ukraine, things are worse.” Ukraine is going through hell. Putin’s invasion—supported by the majority of the Russian population (either actively or by inaction)—severely damaged Ukraine’s economy and demographics. Ukraine lost her best sons and daughters who sacrificed their lives to defend their homes. But Ukraine didn’t choose this war. It’s like pointing to a victim of home invasion by a ruthless gang and saying: “Look how badly their home is now damaged, the child is maimed, the furniture is broken, the kitchen was set on fire.” And so what—just allowing the gang to take over and becoming their slaves was better? Having the gang to recruit your child and sending him to invade other people’s homes was better? Paying ransom to the gang, allowing them to plunder and steal was better? Allowing them to grab your wife and daughter was better? Being invaded by a ruthless gang is a horrifying ordeal. I hope you never experience anything like this in your life. But you need to think now what would you do if the same thing happened to you, to your country. Would you run away? Millions of Ukrainians did. Would you join the invaders? Millions of Ukrainians were forced to do it (some chose to lose everything and escape, some joined willingly). What would you call “winning” in such situation? Decide now. Because if Putin manages to score a “win” in Ukraine, he’s not stopping there. 776 views View 45 upvotes View 2 shares