Shtilerman [his image below] is the founder of FirePoint,
a Ukrainian defense company.
On July 13 in Paris, 10 European countries launched Freyja, a coalition to build a European system for intercepting ballistic missiles. Its purpose is simple: not to replace the American-made Patriot, but to ensure that Europe’s ability to defend itself no longer depends on a single manufacturer, a single country or a single political decision.
That same night, Russia launched eight ballistic missiles at Ukraine. Patriot systems intercepted five of them. It was the first time in nearly two weeks that Ukraine had managed to shoot down any Russian ballistic missiles, due to a critical shortage caused by the extensive use of Patriots in the United States’ war with Iran and by limited global production.
The next morning, Ukrainian long-range drones struck an oil refinery in Salavat, the last major Russian refinery they had not yet reached. Those drones are made by FirePoint, the company I founded. Soon, we will also manufacture ballistic-missile interceptors and a ballistic missile of our own.
At first glance, these are three different stories. In fact, they are one. They are about how war has changed. And about the central lesson that not only Ukraine, but also the United States, Europe and every democracy that wants to remain secure must learn: Survival cannot be outsourced to a single country or entrusted to a single company.
The world marvels at Ukrainian drones and wants to buy them. But what it should really marvel at is how Ukraine, with such limited resources, built such a modern defense industry so quickly. It did so because it treated defense not as a matter of policy, but as a matter of survival. Politics teaches you to live within the limits of the possible. Survival forces you beyond them.
Ukraine’s modern defense industry did not develop in the same way as the military-industrial complexes of the U.S. or Europe. An existential threat forced it to move away from long development cycles, closed platforms, dependence on a single manufacturer and the pursuit of a “perfect” system. Ukrainian drones, for example, take advantage of an inexpensive airframe, readily available components, guidance that does not rely on a satellite signal the enemy jams, and constant — almost daily — adaptation.
Five countries, including the U.S., have recently signed an agreement to establish a European center for servicing Patriot missiles. The announcement is welcome. Everyone values the Patriot system. It is an excellent system.
But opening a factory in Europe to produce or service American missiles is not enough. Today’s wars have shown that the production of ballistic missiles is far outpacing the production of interceptors. In just five weeks, from June 2 to July 6, Russia launched 114 ballistic missiles and a total of 24 Zircon and Oniks missiles at Kyiv. Global production of the most advanced PAC-3 MSE version of the Patriot interceptor is only about 50 missiles a month. In five weeks, Kyiv alone consumes more than two months’ worth of global production.
To solve the problem of scale, a defense industry must be built the way the internet was built: without a single center, without a critical point of failure. War does not reward perfection. It rewards speed and reliability. That is why I increasingly doubt that the future belongs to weapons as stand-alone products, or to the defense industry as merely a collection of companies. The future belongs to ecosystems.
That is the idea behind Freyja: Not to build another Patriot, but to create an ecosystem in which no single manufacturer, factory or state determines the fate of the entire system. Network logic and redundancy are pervasive in the arrangement. For example, consider the project’s intellectual-property escrow arrangement: Technical documentation will be deposited so that, under predetermined conditions, production can be transferred to another participant in the program while preserving the technology owner’s rights and continuing royalty payments. Software and technical systems should not contain hidden dependencies on any single company or state, and they should be open to independent audit.
The best weapon in insufficient numbers loses to a sufficient number of good weapons. Ukraine paid dearly to learn that lesson. Other democracies need to learn from our early mistakes. Freyja is a good sign that they are starting to do just that. In the 21st century, survival is no longer imported. It is produced. As democracies recognize that their own survival is at stake, they will have to act together to strengthen the system they are defending.
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The conversation explores the themes of military innovation, defense strategies, and the influence of political and industrial interests on military procurement. Participants in this discussion highlight Ukraine's ingenuity in developing effective, low-cost drones and other military technologies, contrasting it with the U.S. focus on expensive, complex weapons systems. Many comments criticize the U.S. military-industrial complex for prioritizing profit over practicality and suggest that the U.S. could learn from Ukraine's approach to defense. There is also a recurring critique of political figures and decisions, particularly those associated with former President Trump, regarding military aid and strategy. Overall, the discussion reflects admiration for Ukraine's resilience and innovation in the face of conflict, while expressing concern over the U.S.'s current defense practices and priorities.
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Fire Point Founder Denya Shtilerman
Fire Point founder Denys Shtilerman during the parliamentary commission hearing. Photo from the Telegram channel of commission chairman Oleksii
Fire Point founder Denys Shtilerman during the parliamentary commission hearing. Photo from the Telegram channel of commission chairman Oleksii Honcharenko
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