How the Peace Plan Looks to Ukraine and Russia

Our correspondents discuss the prospects for President Trump’s plan to end the war.

By Katrin Bennhold

I’m the host of The World

The New York Times, Nov 25, 12:30 a.m. ET 

After a Russian missile attack in Ternopil, western Ukraine.Credit...Mauricio Lima for The New York Times  

Unpacking the Ukraine peace plan 

The war in Ukraine has been raging for almost four years; 11 if you start with Crimea’s annexation in 2014. So many predictions have proved wrong along the way: Russia will win within a week. Ukraine is winning, against the odds. Western sanctions will bleed Russia dry and force it to the negotiating table.

Instead, this has turned into a war of attrition, with Russia slowly advancing.

The demands on both sides are irreconcilable. Russia will never withdraw to a pre-2014 position, analysts say. Ukraine will never agree to a deal that doesn’t include assurances against a future invasion by Russia. But in between those positions, what are the cards each side holds? Where is there room for negotiation?

Andrew Kramer, our Ukraine bureau chief, and Anatoly Kurmanaev, a longtime correspondent in Russia, have covered the war from the beginning. I gave them both a call.

Andrew, what are Ukraine’s red lines?

Territory is absolutely critical. They also need credible security guarantees. The agreement does offer Ukraine security guarantees, but the version we saw doesn’t spell them out. That’s apparently being worked out in a separate annex to the agreement. So that’s really where the rubber meets the road. 

Anatoly, what are Russia’s red lines?

Ruling out Ukrainian NATO membership for good — not just a promise, but enshrining it in Ukrainian law and NATO’s statutes. Russia also wants to claim some additional territory, like the Donbas, that Putin can sell as a victory. The presence of NATO troops in Ukraine is also a hard no.

Andrew, what territory, at a maximum, could you see Ukraine ceding?

Ukraine in March already agreed to acease-fire along the current frontline. So that would be de facto recognition of Russian control of everything east and south of the frontline. But the addition in the plan is the part of the Donetsk region that remains under Ukrainian control. It would probably take Russia at least two years to capture that. Giving it away is a red line. 

One compromise might be calling this area a demilitarized zone under Russian control.

And could Ukraine live with that in exchange for concessions elsewhere?

That’s really the big ask: Could the government in Kyiv present this to Ukrainians as necessary for a long-term peace? Privately, Ukrainian officials say that security guarantees are more important than the exact location of the new demilitarized zone. Because that’s what guarantees the long-term sovereignty and security of the country. It’s what would allow economic development to restart.

So what do credible security guarantees look like?

The models on the table are to have some European troops west of the Dnipro River, which would be largely symbolic, as a reassurance force; a tripwire model, which would require some larger force in Europe that would be triggered to join the fight by another attack; or a promise of Western assistance if Russia were to invade again — something modeled on NATO’s Article 5 of mutual defense but without NATO.

Ukrainian soldiers in the Zaporizhzhia region of Ukraine last month. Credit...Tyler Hicks/The New York Times

Anatoly, remind us of Russia’s objections to a relationship between NATO and Ukraine.

Putin called the invasion a campaign to “de-Nazify” and “demilitarize” Ukraine. This narrative stems from falsehoods about Ukrainian history and its government. But the stated rationale is that Russia invaded to eliminate a perceived threat, and the threat was Ukraine gravitating toward NATO. The Kremlin has presented the war as a pre-emptive strike.

NATO’s gradual eastward expansion prompted a very real sense of outrage among Russians, including Putin critics. People do worry about Ukraine becoming a base for Western troops and missiles.

Andrew, is there a way to work around the NATO objection by having peacekeepers wearing a European Union hat instead?

That happened in Georgia on the contact line between Russia and Georgia in the South Ossetia and Abkhazia regions. So there is a precedent for that. 

Viewed from Ukraine, do you think there’s a credible chance that this plan could actually lead to a peace deal?

Yes, I do. Eventually. The more iterations this goes through, the more likely something will stick.

And there are some points where there’s scope for negotiation. The size of the cap on the Ukrainian military, for instance. Analysts say Ukraine’s postwar military will inevitably have to be reduced in size. They can’t keep a million-man standing army.

And on NATO: there’s an understanding that Ukraine will not get into NATO because not all members of NATO would accept it. So this is no longer the disagreement it once was.

Anatoly, what about Russia?

For all the faults of this plan, it seems to at least to try to incorporate some core demands on both sides. What do both sides need at the bare minimum to stop fighting? Both Putin and Zelensky face massive domestic challenges, and they both have to sell this as a victory to their constituents.

Andrew, do people in Ukraine give Trump credit for trying to negotiate something?

Yes, there’s perhaps surprising support. There was extraordinary frustration with the Biden administration’s policies of slow-walking aid, without making any efforts on the diplomatic side. The idea that there’s some sort of settlement potentially in the works is very hopeful, even if this might not be the final version.